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Abstract:	 This	 article,	 utilizing	 the	 theoretical	 framework	 of	 Pearson	 and	 Hobbs	 (2004),	
defines	the	middle	market	in	counterfeit	alcohol	distribution	and	its	associated	‘enterprise’.	
Drugs	 markets	 have	 a	 resemblance	 to	 counterfeit	 alcohol	 markets	 in	 as	 much	 that	 they	
share	the	illicit	nature	of	the	product	and	the	need	to	distribute	the	product	at	the	'street'	10	
level.	Drawing	on	two	case	studies	taken	from	a	European	regulator	the	article	details	the	
dynamics	 of	 the	 market,	 the	 enterprise	 actions	 of	 the	 actors	 and	 how	 law	 enforcement	
responses	 can,	 in	 certain	 circumstances,	 make	 the	 task	 of	 the	 distributors	 easier.	 The	
traditional	notions	of	organized	crime	are	challenged	and	organization	of	counterfeit	alcohol	
markets	is	viewed	as	being	reliant	upon	those	who	have	legitimate	access	to	the	market	and	





Utilising	 the	 theoretical	 framework	 of	 Pearson	 and	 Hobbs	 (2004),	 this	 article	 defines	 the	
middle	market	 in	 counterfeit	 alcohol	 distribution	 and	 its	 associated	 ‘enterprise’.	 Pearson	
and	Hobbs	 (2001,	 2004)	 discuss	 the	 problems	 in	 defining	 the	 ‘middle	market’	 of	 criminal	
enterprise,	 arguing	 that	 it	 is	 fluid	 and	 dependent	 on	 the	 range	 of	 actors	 and	 types	 of	
networks.	They	also	describe	how	actors	can	acquire	different	roles	within	different	strata	













alcohol	market	 in	 terms	of	 the	role	of	actors.	However,	 the	utilisation	of	 the	Pearson	and	


















counterfeit	 alcohol	 hides.	 Therefore,	 an	 understanding	 of	 market	 structures	 that	 aid	50	
distribution	is	one	means	of	exposing	counterfeit	alcohol	from	its	hiding	place.	
Why	are	we	concerned	with	 locating	 the	middle	market?	 	A	greater	understanding	of	 the	
market	 structure	 assists	 us	 in	 understanding	 the	 trading	 conditions	 and	 relationships	









market	 elements,	 for	 example	 there	 is	 a	 production	market	 in	 counterfeit	 alcohol	 and	 a	
distribution	 market	 and	 there	 is	 a	 different	 middle	 market	 in	 relation	 to	 each	 of	 these	
activities	that	will	include	a	different	range	of	actors,	although	some	actors	could	be	in	both	
markets.	However,	these	markets	may	be	located	in	different	countries	and	it	is	more	likely	
that	there	 is	 little	crossover	 in	actors	between	production	and	distribution.	Understanding	
the	structure	of	the	distribution	market	provides	regulators	with	market	based	knowledge	60	






counterfeit	 alcohol.	 The	arguments	presented	here	are	based	on	an	 integrated	 script	 and	
social	network	analysis	of	the	case	files	of	a	European	regulator	that	concerned	two	cases	of	
the	 cross-jurisdictional	 distribution	 of	 counterfeit	 alcohol.1	 The	 case	 files	 raise	 interesting	




the	 necessary	 substantial	 relations	 of	 connection	 would	 ideally	 be	 informed	 through	
intensive,	qualitative	 interviews	with	those	 involved	in	the	distribution	market	but	the	on-
																																								 																				
1	For further details on methods and data see Lord et al. (2017) and Bellotti et al. (forthcoming).	










time	 constraints	 of	 the	 research	 permitted	 only	 an	 in-depth	 analysis	 of	 the	 full	 case	 files	
alongside	interviews	with	the	regulators.		
To	build	on	our	earlier	analysis	of	counterfeit	alcohol	distribution	(Lord,	et	al.,	2017;	Bellotti,	
et	 al.,	 forthcoming),	 in	 this	 article	 we	 seek,	 in	 line	 with	 the	 model	 of	 middle	 markets	80	
developed	by	Pearson	and	Hobbs	(2001),	to	construct	an	analysis	of	the	market	structure	of	
counterfeit	alcohol	distribution	and	 its	associated	entrepreneurial	dynamics.	 In	doing	 this,	
we	 integrate	 a	 market	 structure	 analysis	 (i.e.	 nature	 and	 functioning	 of	 the	 counterfeit	
alcohol	 market)	 with	 an	 understanding	 of	 micro-level	 actor	 dynamics	 (i.e.	 social/criminal	
networks	 and	 processes	 of	 crime	 commission).	 First,	 the	 paper	 addresses	 the	 issue	 of	
defining	 the	 middle	 market	 and	 then	 argues	 for	 the	 necessity	 of	 understanding	 illicit	
enterprise	at	this	structural	level.	Second,	we	present	two	inter-linked	case	studies	from	the	
case	files	and	a	discussion	of	what	these	case	studies	tell	us	in	relation	to	the	distribution	of	
counterfeit	 alcohol.	Here,	we	 consider	 the	organised	 activities	of	 those	 actors	 involved	 in	
the	processes	of	distribution	and	movement	of	the	illicit	product	at	the	middle	market	level.	90	
The	final	section	of	the	paper	explores	how	an	understanding	of	the	dynamics	between	the	




















vodka	 came	 to	 the	 attention	 of	 regulators	 in	 Jurisdiction	 B	 and	 a	 raid	 on	 a	 nightclub	
indicated	 that	 counterfeit	 vodka	 was	 for	 sale;	 the	 vodka	 was	 a	 common	 brand.	 Empty	
bottles,	caps	and	packaging	were	found	at	the	premises.	Investigations	into	the	origin	of	the	
vodka	revealed	that	the	product	was	sourced	from	Jurisdiction	A	and	the	relevant	regulator	
was	 contacted.	 The	 case	 files	 of	 the	 regulator	 in	 Jurisdiction	 A	 reveal	 a	 network	 of	
distribution	 that	 relies	 on	 a	 number	 of	 actors	 each	with	 their	 own	 skills,	 knowledge	 and	
contacts.		110	
David	owns	a	small	delivery	and	courier	company,	‘Delivery	Ltd’,	located	in	Jurisdiction	A.	He	
has	 numerous	 legitimate	 delivery	 and	 logistic	 contracts	 and	 delivers	 across	 both	
jurisdictions.	The	files	indicate	that	David	receives	or	arranges	for	the	collection/delivery	of	
the	counterfeit	vodka	to	a	storage	premises	that	he	either	owns	or	has	access	to,	however,	
the	 location	 of	 these	 premises	 and	 the	 origins	 of	 the	 counterfeit	 vodka	 prior	 to	 David	
receiving	 it	 are	 unknown.	 David	 receives	 the	 counterfeit	 vodka	 bottled	 and	 labelled,	 so	
ready	for	distribution.	He	arranges	for	the	product	to	be	transported	from	Jurisdiction	A	to	
Jurisdiction	B	using	legitimate	logistical	systems,	Parcel	Network,	Crossland,	Freight	Inc.	and	
Bard	 Transport.	 The	 description	 of	 the	 counterfeit	 vodka	 is	 falsified	 and	 the	 consignment	
wrapped	in	opaque	plastic.	David	arranges	for	the	delivery	of	the	counterfeit	vodka	to	the	120	
																																								 																				
2	It was agreed by the authors with the providers of the data that	the jurisdictions and the identity of the 


















the	distributors;	 to	regain	control	of	 the	counterfeit	product	 it	 is	delivered	to	MB	Testing,	130	
which	is	not	the	destination.	When	the	load	arrives	at	MB	Testing	an	employee	asks	for	it	to	
be	 forwarded	 to	 premises	 around	 the	 corner:	 Food	Wholesalers	 Ltd	 owned	 by	 Paul.	 This	
tactic	disguises	the	actual	delivery	address	as	the	delivery	 location	 is	not	the	final	delivery	
address,	thus	distancing	the	counterfeit	load	from	the	destination.	Once	at	the	destination	
the	 counterfeit	 consignment	 is	 broken	 down	 into	 smaller	 consignments	 and	 distributed,	
however,	 the	 case	 files	 contain	 only	 scant	 information	 on	 the	 lower	 or	 street	 level	
distribution.	 David	 does	 have	 some	 cross-jurisdictional	 contacts	 with	 John	 and	 Andrew	






























again	 legitimate	 logistic	 networks	 are	 used	 to	 move	 the	 counterfeit	 vodka	 across	
jurisdictional	boundaries.	In	this	case	the	arrangement	is	made	by	a	third	party,	James,	who	
instructs	a	 logistics	broker	to	move	an	assignment	of	bottled	water.	This	shipping/logistics	
company	 sells	 the	 contract	 forward	 stripping	out	 their	 profit	 as	 they	 go.	 This	happens	on	
three	occasions	before	the	contract	is	purchased	by	an	individual	haulier,	Jim’s	Trucks,	who	
collects	 the	 load	and	 transports	 it.	On	crossing	 the	border,	 the	haulier	 is	 stopped	and	 the	
load	searched	and	over	17000	litres	of	counterfeit	alcohol	seized.		
This	was	a	relatively	simple	operation	and	the	final	delivery	address	was	not	concealed	as	in	
the	 ‘Delivery	 Case’	 and	 the	 ‘North	 Case’	 does	 not	 appear	 to	 require	 the	 same	 level	 of	160	
organisation.	 It	 appears	 that	 the	 seizure	 of	 the	 load	 in	 the	 ‘North	 Case’	 resulted	 in	 the	
organisation	 of	 the	movement	 of	 the	 counterfeit	 vodka	 as	 detailed	 in	 the	 ‘Delivery	 Case’	
which	is	a	more	sophisticated	approach	to	the	movement	of	the	counterfeit	vodka.	What	is	
striking	is	the	speed	with	which	the	second	delivery	process	was	initiated	and	established.	
This	 is	 reflected	 by	 the	 adaptability	 of	 the	 network	 to	 restructure	 itself	 to	 ensure	 the	
delivery	 of	 the	 counterfeit	 product.	 The	 speed	 of	 the	 organisation	 also	 suggests	 that	 the	















What	do	these	two	cases	tell	us	about	the	market	 in	counterfeit	alcohol?	There	 is	a	 lively	





scale	 and	 nature	 of	 illegal	 alcohol	 production	 and	 sale	 are	 impossible	 to	 ascertain	 with	180	
certainty,	 but	 the	 UK	 customs	 authorities	 believe	 the	 problem	 is	 increasing	 and,	 in	
association	with	the	UK	Border	Agency,	have	recently	updated	their	strategy	to	tackle	it’.	As	
																																								 																				















price.	 It	 is	 impossible	 to	 tell	 without	 testing,	 however,	 which	 of	 these	 products	
contain	other	potentially	toxic	contaminants.”	(McKee	et	al.	2012:	10)	
The	key	point	 is	 that	 there	 is	an	active	market	and	to	sustain	and	expand	 it	will	 require	a	
consistent	supply	of	the	illicit	product.	In	this	way,	the	counterfeit	alcohol	market	has	some	190	
similarities	with	the	illicit	drug	market	(see	Pearson	and	Hobbs,	2001).	Ensuring	supply	is	a	
critical	entrepreneurial	 function	 if	 the	profit	 is	 to	be	taken	from	the	market.	One	problem	
for	 the	 counterfeit	 alcohol	 entrepreneur	 is	 that	 a	 considerable	 amount	 of	 counterfeit	
alcohol	is	transported	between	different	jurisdictions	and	this	has	to	be	done,	as	illustrated	
in	the	case	studies,	by	disguising	the	product	as	something	else.	The	clandestine	movement	







retail	 outlets	 across	 a	 significant	 geographical	 area.	 The	 case	 files	 chart	 the	movement	of	
the	 counterfeit	 vodka	 from	 the	 post-production	 phase	 to	 the	 distribution	 phase,	 and	 the	
focus	of	the	case	files	is	at	a	middle	level	in	the	market.	Once	the	counterfeit	alcohol	arrives	











found	when	 such	premises	were	 raided.	 	 The	 case	 files	 also	 suggest	 a	 significant	 regional	
market	penetration	 and	 for	 this	 to	be	 achieved	 it	would	be	necessary	 to	break	 the	 initial	210	
consignment	 down	 into	 smaller	 lots.	 Therefore,	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 case	 files	 provides	 a	
window	onto	a	middle	market	operation,	there	is	no	detail	of	how	the	counterfeit	product	is	
sold	on	or	distributed	at	the	‘street	level’.	What	the	case	files	illustrate	is	the	movement	of	
the	counterfeit	vodka	 from	the	producers	or	 those	 in	close	contact	with	 the	producers	 to	
those	who	organise	the	distribution	of	the	illicit	product.	These	are	two	different	networks	
with	 a	 ‘bridging	 node’	 that	 is	 able	 to	 facilitate	 the	 purchase	 and	 movement	 of	 the	 fake	
vodka	from	one	network	to	another.		
The	middle	market	distribution	network	 is	 relatively	 small,	enlarged	out	of	necessity	once	
the	strategy	for	transportation	in	the	North	Case	had	been	discovered.	This	enlargement	of	
the	 network	 to	 conceal	 the	 movement	 of	 the	 counterfeit	 vodka	 brings	 associated	 risks,	220	
simply	 by	 the	 need	 to	 increase	 the	 size	 of	 the	 network	 increases	 the	 risk	 of	 detection.	
However,	the	Delivery	Case	network	remains	relatively	compact	with	Stephen	acting	as	the	




The	work	of	Pearson	and	Hobbs	 (2001,	2004)	 is	concerned	with	drug	markets	where	 they	
define	the	typical	 form	of	criminal	organisation	concerning	the	middle	market	as	 involving	











four-tier	 level	 of	 classification;	 importers,	 wholesalers,	 middle	 market	 drug	 brokers	 and	
retail	level	dealers	(Pearson	and	Hobbs	2001).	This	four-tier	system	does	not	imply		
“…that	 there	 are	 always	 and	 only	 four	 links	 in	 the	 supply	 chain,	 since	 some	
individuals	occupy	dual	roles	(e.g.	import	and	wholesale),	while	middle	market	drug	
brokers	are	 sometimes	known	 to	 collect	 and	 import	drugs	 from	wholesale	 storage	




The	 counterfeit	 alcohol	 case	 files	 indicate	 a	 potentially	 similar	 classification	 except	 that	
‘producer’	 could	 replace	 the	 ‘importer’	 classification	 if	 the	 counterfeit	 alcohol	 is	 being	
produced	(distilled	in	the	case	of	spirits)	in	the	same	country	or	jurisdiction	as	the	wholesale	
activity.	 The	 case	 files	 provide	 no	 clear	 indication	 of	 where	 the	 counterfeit	 product	 was	
produced	 but	 the	 regulator’s	 provisional	 analysis	 indicates	 that	 it	 was	 imported	 to	 the	
jurisdiction	for	bottling	and	onward	transportation.	 	 In	terms	of	the	middle-market	actors,	
there	are	 clear	 similarities	 in	 the	 structural	 relations	of	 the	 criminal	networks.	By	 ‘market	
structure’	 then,	 we	 are	 referring	 to	 the	 structural	 actor	 relations	 in	 the	 context	 of	 illicit	
commercial	collaboration	and	their	substantial	connections	and	interactions.	
However,	the	counterfeit	alcohol	market	is	significantly	different	to	a	drug	market	in	several	250	
ways.	 Most	 importantly,	 drugs	 are	 a	 proscribed	 product	 and	 so	 any	 market	 should	 be	
hidden	 and	 protected,	where	 possible,	 from	 the	 actions	 of	 law	 enforcement.	 Counterfeit	
alcohol	must	 be	 sold	 as	 being	 something	 that	 it	 is	 not	 –	 a	 branded	 product	 –	when	 it	 is	
usually	of	an	 inferior	quality	and	not	produced	by	the	brand	owner.	Counterfeit	alcohol	 is	










dynamics	 imply	a	need	 for	 ‘enterprise’	by	 those	 involved.	That	 is,	 the	collaborating	actors	
require	an	understanding	of,	and	ability	to	react	to,	processes	of	supply,	demand,	regulation	
and	 competition	 for	 their	 activities	 to	 be	 financially	 rewarding	 (see	 Albanese,	 2012).	
Structure	 and	 enterprise	 are	 central	 to	 the	 middle	 market	 of	 counterfeit	 alcohol	260	
distribution.	
The	counterfeit	alcohol	in	the	cases	we	analysed	was	thought	by	the	regulator	to	have	been	
imported	 ‘industrial’	 or	 imported	 distilled	 alcohol	 but	 labelled	 as	 ‘industrial	 alcohol’	 as	 a	











identifiable	 crime-organizations	may	 therefore	well	 be	 considered	 the	outcome	of	
organizing	one's	forbidden	trade	and	industry,	an	outcome	which	is	often	not	even	
intended	 or	 which	 consists	 of	 a	 post	 hoc	 legal	 construction	 by	 the	 police	 or	
prosecutor.”	(van	Duyne	1997:	203	emphasis	in	original)	
Understanding	the	organisation	of	crime	moves	us	away	from	constructing	organised	crime	
as	 hierarchical	 trans-national	 crime	 groups.	 This	 framework	 for	 understanding	 the	280	
																																								 																				










together	 in	 a	 loose	 network	with	 some	 degree	 of	 adaptability	 and	 transience.	 Bright	 and	
Delaney	 (2013)	 in	exploring	drug	markets	notes	 the	need	 for	 flexibility	 to	avoid	detection	
and	ensure	secrecy	and	that	this	militates	against	a	hierarchical	structure.		
Our	analysis	of	the	two	sets	of	case	files	demonstrated	some	links	between	the	two	cases	
(i.e.	 the	 cases	 do	 not	 represent	 discrete,	 independent	 criminal	 enterprise).	 Thus,	 those	
operating	 in	 the	 middle	 market	 are	 essentially	 partnerships	 and	 transactions	 between	
independent	 ‘traders’	 and	 ‘brokers’.	 In	 line	with	empirical	 research	 into	 ‘organised	 crime’	
(Paoli,	2002;	Edwards	and	Levi,	2008;	Hobbs,	2013),	this	moves	us	away	from	attempting	to	





the	 fluid	 and	 dynamic	 collaborative	 activities	 of	 multiple	 actors	 and	 networks	 variously	
structured	 throughout	 the	middle	market,	 connected	 through	 their	 shared	 goals	 of	 profit	
generation.	These	actors	are	concerned	with	their	 immediate	activities,	rather	than	within	
the	 functioning	of	 the	whole	enterprise.	However,	 the	 case	 file	data	 indicate	 that	 a	 small	
number	 of	 ‘hidden’	 actors	 that	 financed	 the	 distribution	 did	 connect	 either	 side	 of	 the	











‘actual	decision-making	processes	engaged	by	 illicit	 traders’	 (Edwards	and	Gill,	 2002:	218)	
and	 how	 such	 decisions	 are	 influenced	 by	 market	 structures.	 	 More	 specifically,	 ‘…an	
understanding	 of	 different	 market	 structures	 is	 a	 necessary	 precursor	 to	 explaining	 how	
different	 traders	 apprehend	 the	 constraints	 and	 opportunities	 provided	 in	 these	markets	
and	thus	why	certain	markets	contract	whilst	others	expand’	(Edwards	and	Gill	2002:	219).	
Our	 case	 file	 analysis	 gives	 us	 insight	 into	 the	 market	 location	 of	 the	 offenders	 and	 the	
qualitative	differences	between	drug	markets	and	counterfeit	alcohol	markets,	and	we	are	





has	 to	 be	 in	 order	 to	 be	 successful.	 It	 is	 achieved	 not	 by	 the	 traditionally	 constructed	
hierarchical	organised	crime	groups	but	by	a	network	of	actors	collaborating	to	achieve	the	
aim	of	distributing	the	counterfeit	product.	A	crime	scripts	analysis	of	this	case	(see	Lord	et	
al.,	 2017)	 details	 the	 actions	 and	 resources	 required	 to	 organise	 the	 middle	 market	
distribution	 of	 the	 counterfeit	 vodka.	 The	 offending	 is	 detailed	 by	 scenes	 that	 detail	 the	
behaviours	in	each	scene.	The	scripts	analysis	also	identifies	the	key	actors	and	how	they	are	320	
connected	across	the	criminal	enterprise.	This	approach	is	reinforced	by	the	use	of	a	social	
network	 analysis	 that	 identifies	 the	 integral	 actors	 to	 each	 of	 the	 scenes	 in	 the	 script	
analysis.	 This	 linking	 of	 actors	 within	 a	 network	 and	 within	 scenes	 provides	 a	 detailed	
















‘The	 most	 useful	 way	 to	 characterise	 serious	 crime	 networks	
operating	within	middle	market	 drug	 distribution	 is	 as	 small,	 constantly	mutating,	
flexible	systems’	(Hobbs,	1997:	67)	
The	notion	of	the	hierarchical	organised	crime	group,	whilst	undoubtedly	existing	in	certain	
locations,	 is	not	ubiquitous	and	much	serious	crime	 is	organised	 in	more	fluid	and	flexible	
formats.	The	case	studies	presented	here	support	Hobbs’	argument	as	there	is	a	change	of	
approach	once	the	‘North	Case’	distribution	route	is	discovered	that	demonstrates	flexibility	
and	 adaptation.	 The	 networks	 in	 both	 ‘operations’	 are	 relatively	 small	 and	 so	 might	 be	
characterised	as	a	serious	crime	network.	The	crime	group	does	not	need	the	rigidity	of	the	340	
hierarchy	 with	 chains	 of	 command	 and	 the	 organisational	 problems	 that	 accompany	 a	
‘command	 structure’.	 The	 network	 is	 comprised	 of	 actors	 who	 have	 specific	 roles	 in	 the	
commission	of	the	offence	to	ensure	the	success	of	the	operation.	In	the	Delivery	Case,	for	
example,	 David	 has	 to	 organise	 the	 logistics	 of	 moving	 the	 counterfeit	 alcohol	 from	 one	
jurisdiction	to	another,	that	is	his	function,	and	once	achieved	he	has	nothing	to	do	with	the	
lower	level	distribution	in	Jurisdiction	B.		David	is	recruited,	or	given	a	more	prominent	role	
in	 the	network	once	 the	North	 route	has	 been	discovered.	 This	 is	 a	 flexible	 and	 adaptive	
network.	 There	 is	 no	 evidence	 of	 hierarchy	 and	 no	 evidence	 of	 longevity	 in	 the	 network.	









knowledge	of	 the	structure	of	 logistics	and	his	 legitimacy	 in	the	marketplace	makes	him	a	350	
valuable	asset.		
We	might	anticipate	 that	 the	distribution	of	counterfeit	alcohol,	as	 its	 illicit	 it	 is	 similar	 to	
drugs,	 will	 be	 undertaken	 by	 organised	 crime	 constructed	 in	 a	 traditional	 form	 as	 it	 is	 a	
profitable	illicit	product.	If	we	do	not	find	traditionally	constructed	organised	crime	groups	
in	 drug	 and	 counterfeit	 alcohol	markets	why	 is	 there	 anticipation	 that	 they	 are	 active	 in	
other	areas	of	food	industry?	
In	 the	UK	 the	Horsemeat	 incident	of	20135	 resulted	 in	 the	Elliott	Review	 (2013	and	2014)	
and	the	final	report	stated:	
“…the	 serious	 end	 of	 food	 fraud	 is	 organised	 crime,	 and	 the	 profits	 can	 be	
substantial.	 The	 recommendations	 in	 this	 report	will	 not	 stop	 food	 crime,	 but	 are	360	
intended	to	make	it	much	more	difficult	for	criminals	to	operate	in	the	UK.”	(Elliott,	
2014:12)	




that	 both	 Polish	 and	 Italian	mafia	 gangs	 are	 running	multimillion-pound	 scams	 to	
substitute	horsemeat	for	beef	during	food	production.”	(Observer	2013)	
Yet	these	‘gangs’	have	never	been	identified	and	the	processing	of	the	prosecutions	for	the	
horsemeat	 episode	 in	 British	 food	 in	 2013	 suggests	 that	 it	 was	 a	 series	 of	 actions	 that	370	
occurred	internally	to	the	European	meat	trade.	The	inference	in	the	Elliott	Review	(2014)	is	
that	 there	 are	 organised	 criminals	 focused	 on	 food	 fraud	 yet	 the	 report	 has	 no	 detailed	
knowledge	of	how	such	crime	groups	operate,	are	structured	or	where	their	activities	are	
																																								 																				
5	The Horsemeat Incident 2013 occurred when horsemeat was found in a number of processed meat products, 











the	National	Crime	Agency	 (Elliot,	 2014).	One	of	 the	 key	 recommendations	 in	 the	Review	
was	 the	 setting	 up	 of	 a	 National	 Food	 Crime	 Unit	 (NFCU)	 to	 be	 located	within	 the	 Food	
Standards	 Agency	 (FSA).	 The	 NFCU	 was	 established	 in	 2015	 and	 has	 no	 operational	 or	





‘Threats	 exist	 at	 a	number	of	 levels:	 from	 random	acts	of	dishonesty	by	 individual	
‘rogues’	to	organised	fraudulent	activity	by	groups	who	knowingly	set	out	to	deceive	
consumers	or	expose	them	to	harm.’	(FSA,	2016:7)	
The	main	 focus	 is	 on	 the	 activities	 of	 certain	 actors	who	 are	 either	 ‘rogues’	 or	 are	more	
focused	 in	organising	 frauds,	but	 these	actors	 are	not	 constructed	as	organised	 criminals.	
The	same	document	goes	onto	suggest	that:	





academic	 literature	 the	 problem	 of	 food	 fraud	 is	 seen	 to	 be	 worldwide	 and	 those	
responsible	are	‘fraudsters’	(see	for	example	Ellis	et	al	2015:9403).	
These	 fraudsters	 are	 not	 identified	 and	 are	 presented	 as	 having	 as	 their	 main	 aim	 the	









jurisdictional	 collaboration	but	 it	occurs	only	where	 it	 contributes	 to	 the	execution	of	 the	
offence,	 in	other	words	where	 it	 ‘fits’	 the	 script	analysis	of	 the	case.	There	are	“mutating	400	
and	flexible”	networks	that	can	be	accommodated	easily	 in	a	crime	script	analysis	(Lord	et	
al.,	2017).	 A	 recent	 case	where	 cannabis	 resin	was	 packed	 into	 orange	 juice	 cartons	was	
headlined	 as	 being	 the	 use	 of	 the	 international	 food	 supply	 chain	 to	 smuggle	 drugs.	 A	
reading	 of	 the	media	 reports	 on	 the	 case	 suggest	 that	 the	 resin	 was	 concealed	 into	 the	
orange	 juice	shipment	as	a	form	of	concealment	and	a	 logistical	requirement	to	move	the	
resin	from	the	north	of	Ireland	to	the	UK	(BBC	2016).	The	BBC	headline	suggests	that	this	is	
‘an	 organised	 crime	 gang’	 (BBC	 2016).	 The	moving	 of	 the	 resin	 is	 organised	 but	 probably	
much	more	to	the	Hobbs’	description	than	that	of	a	traditional	‘mafia	style’	structured	gang.	
There	is	nothing	remarkable	about	the	food	distribution	chain	being	used,	it	is	available	and	
an	easy	means	of	concealing	 illicit	product	amongst	 legitimate	product,	 such	concealment	410	
could	easily	occur	in	other	distribution	chains.	
Importantly	it	is	apparent	that	the	organisation	of	frauds	in	the	food	and	drink	industry	are	
more	 commonly	 located	 within	 the	 industry	 networks	 rather	 than	 being	 the	 activity	 of	
externally	 located	 criminals	 who	 decide	 to	 exploit	 the	 opportunities	 for	 fraud	within	 the	
food	 and	 drink	 industry.	 Within	 the	 food	 and	 drink	 industry	 networks	 of	 business,	


















of	 counterfeit	 alcohol.	 This	means	 that	 the	 organisation	 of	 the	 two	 activities	 is	 different,	
however,	 the	analysis	of	 the	case	 files	 suggests	 that	counterfeit	vodka	 is	organised	by	co-
operating	 small	 networks.	 Research	 on	 food	 fraud	 suggests	 a	 similar	 structure	 but	 the	
difference	 being	 that	 the	 networks	 are	 located	 in	 the	 production	 process,	 so	 they	 are	
internal	to	the	food	industry.	The	networks	in	the	production	and	distribution	of	counterfeit	430	
alcohol	are	located	externally	to	the	mainstream	production	of	alcohol.	Second,	counterfeit	
alcohol	 relies	 much	 more	 on	 the	 organisation	 of	 clandestine	 activities	 within	 legitimate	
business	practices	used	as	a	cover	for	criminal	action.	




include	 doctors	 who	 combine	 generous	 prescribing	 with	 collection	 of	 a	 fee	 for	
services;	 import-export	agencies	which	provide	a	cover	 for	 shipment	of	drugs;	and	
businesses	with	social	and	economic	ties	to	areas	of	illicit	drug	production.	As	can	be	440	
seen	 from	 this	 description,	 Sideliners	 can	 operate	 near	 the	 upper	 reaches	 of	 the	
distribution	 system,	and/or	 in	 the	middle:	 their	 common	 feature	 is	 their	basis	 in	a	
licit	business	enterprise.	This	has	advantages	in	terms	of	the	managers'	experience	of	












In	 the	 case	 studies	 presented	 here	 we	 see	 evidence	 of	 business	 sideliners.	 The	 logistics	
company	run	by	David	is	a	 legitimate	company	providing	a	‘cover	for	the	shipment’	of	the	
counterfeit	vodka.	Food	Wholesalers	Ltd	was	the	destination	for	the	counterfeit	vodka	but	450	
was	 a	 legitimate	 food	 wholesalers	 company.	 The	 company	 had	 a	 legitimate	 means	 of	
onward	 distribution,	 or	 access	 to	 onward	 distributors	 willing	 to	 pay	 for	 the	 counterfeit	
product	as	part	of	their	own	business	enterprise.	As	Dorn	and	South	(1990)	note	there	is	a	
legitimate	 access	 to	 capital	 and	experience	of	 entrepreneurial	 activity	within	 the	 relevant	
field	of	entrepreneurial	activity.	This	would	seem	to	securely	locate	both	Food	Wholesalers	
Ltd	 and	 David	 at	 the	 middle	 market	 point,	 or	 at	 least	 within	 the	 ‘upper	 reaches	 of	 the	
distribution	system’	(Dorn	and	South	1990).		
An	 important	 element	 in	 understanding	 market	 structures	 is	 to	 recognise	 that	 not	 all	
markets	in	counterfeit	vodka	will	be	structured	in	the	same	way,	and	that	markets	in	other	
counterfeit	 alcohols	 may	 well	 be	 different.	 So,	 for	 example	 the	 market	 structure	 of	460	
counterfeit	alcohol	will	be	a	different	niche	to	say	wine	that	 is	of	a	 lesser	standard	than	it	
claims	on	 the	bottle.	The	process	of	 sourcing	 inferior	wine,	obtaining	 the	bottles,	bottling	
and	distribution	we	can	expect	to	be	different	to	counterfeit	vodka	for	a	number	of	reasons.	
One	primary	reason	is	that	counterfeit	vodka	and	wine	are	most	likely	sourced	in	different	
geographic	 locations.	 However,	 there	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 merging	 of	 the	 products	 into	























the	case	study	that	Stephen	 is	 the	bridging	node	between	the	next	higher	 level	of	market	
and	the	middle	market	as	managed	by	the	owners	of	Food	Wholesalers	Ltd.		Critically,	the	
research	reported	here	 indicates	that	the	organization	of	the	trade	 in	counterfeit	vodka	 is	




















market	 and	 also	 is	 indicative	 of	 the	 interaction	 between	 law	 enforcement	 activity	 and	
criminal	enterprise.			
Making	Life	Difficult	for	Law	Enforcement	






In	 a	 form	 of	 ‘spinning’	 the	 information	 to	 fit	 with	 the	 legends	 of	 organized	 crime	 we	


























legitimate,	 for	 example	 alcohol	 produced	 for	 industrial	 processes.	 The	 purchasing	 of	 the	
industrial	alcohol	 in	the	production	jurisdiction	may	also	be	legitimate.	It	 is	the	movement	
of	the	alcohol	and	its	diversion	into	the	legitimate	alcohol	market	as	a	branded	product	that	
is	 the	 fraud.	 The	producers	 need	 to	move	 the	product	 into	 the	 legitimate	market,	 or	 the	
purchasers	are	buying	the	alcohol	with	the	 intent	to	use	 it	 fraudulently.	 	The	alcohol	once	
acquired	need	 to	be	 sold	onto	higher-level	distributors	who	can	 ‘broker’	 the	product	 into	
the	middle	market.		530	
The	entry	 to	the	middle	market	allows	 for	 large	quantities	 to	be	sold	onto	those	who	can	
bottle	 and	 package	 the	 alcohol	 as	 a	 branded	 product,	 and	 so	 the	 industrial	 alcohol	 now	
becomes	‘counterfeit’.	Once	at	this	level	the	product	is	moved	to	distribution	points	where	
it	can	be	sold	on	to	lower	market	actors	with	networks	that	enable	them	to	sell	the	product	
easily	 and	 in	 a	 covert	 way.	 This	 model	 of	 distribution,	 from	 production	 to	 lower	 level	




Understanding	 the	 more	 fractured	 structure	 of	 the	 counterfeit	 market	 and	 its	 different	540	
levels	 provides	 a	 window	 onto	 how	 the	 counterfeit	 operations	 can	 remain	 hidden.	 A	
number	 of	 transactions	 in	 the	 supply	 chain,	 even	 though	 conducted	 with	 criminal	
knowledge	 and	 intent,	 are	 legitimate	 transactions	 and	 therefore	 not	 of	 interest	 to	 law	
enforcement.	For	example	the	production	of	 industrial	alcohol	 is	a	 legitimate	process,	 the	









may	 be	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 counterfeit	 operation.	 Once	 the	 consignment	 is	 split	 and	











region.	 …	 Substandard	 alcohol	 was	 produced	 in	 clandestine	 laboratories.	 Genuine	
empty	 bottles	 were	 smuggled	 from	 Bulgaria.	 Police	 also	 discovered	 a	 second	
organised	 criminal	 network	 led	 by	 the	 deputy	 director	 of	 a	 chain	 of	 liquor	 stores.	560	
Both	 criminal	 groups	 developed	 a	 business	 partnership	 to	 sell	 the	 illicit	 bottles.”	
(Interpol	2016:21emphasis	added)	
This	report	suggests	that	the	actors,	or	some	of	the	actors,	were	legitimate	operators	within	
the	 alcoholic	 drink	 sector,	 that	 the	distribution	network	was	 across	 a	 region	 and	possibly	
utilising	networks	developed	from	the	‘chain	of	liquor	stores’.	There	is	also	a	development	
of	 the	 criminal	 enterprise	 between	 the	 two	 levels	 of	 operation.	 The	 seizures	were	made	















The	 research	 presented	 here,	 and	 the	 subsequent	 discussion,	 reiterate	 the	 theoretical	
discussions	by	Paoli	(2002).	Paoli	argues	that	the	supply	of	illegal	commodities	takes	place	in	
a	 ‘disorganised	way	due	to	the	constraints	of	product	 illegality’	 (Paoli,	2002:	52)	and	 if	we	
combine	 this	 with	 Dorn	 and	 South’s	 (1990)	 analysis	 of	 how	 the	 interventions	 of	 law	
enforcement	shape	market	conditions	it	becomes	visible	that	the	counterfeit	vodka	market	
is	disorganised,	adaptive	and	 flexible	 to	changing	 trading	conditions	and	 law	enforcement	
activity.	 One	 speculative	 finding	 from	 the	 research	 reported	 here	 is	 that	 the	 dynamic	580	
between	law	enforcement	and	the	market,	which	takes	place	to	apprehend	criminals,	may	
significantly	contribute	to	the	difficulties	 they	experience	 in	being	able	to	effectively	close	
down	distribution	chains	of	counterfeit	vodka.		
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